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                                                                     Abstract
This article uses the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations to 
investigate the empirical relationship between federal regulation and 
macroeconomic performance in the U.S. The analysis uses an aggregate production 
framework to study the co-movement of output and the factors of production that 
results from regulation. The use of cointegration methodology overcomes some 
shortcomings of traditional techniques. The results suggest that regulation 
generally is negatively related to aggregate economic performance in both the short 
run and the long run. Some specific areas of regulation are also found to have 
important long-run effects, some positive and some negative
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The macroeconomic impact of government regulation has long been a hotly debated topic 
among politicians. Empirical studies of regulation's impact on the economy, however, have only 
recently appeared in the economics literature. One reason for the long-standing lack of attention 
among economists is the inherent difficulty in measuring the extent of regulation in the 
economy. 
A recent study by Dawson and Seater (2006) overcomes this obstacle by presenting a time-
series measure of federal regulation in the U.S. and relating this measure to macroeconomic 
variables of interest1. 
Dawson and Seater's measure of regulation displays growth in regulation for most years since 
1949. However, there is great variation in the growth rate over time, and this variation is shown 
to be related to the temporal movement in macroeconomic variables including output, total 
factor productivity, labor services, capital services, and private investment. For example, 
Granger-causality tests indicate unidirectional Granger causality from regulation to most of the 
macro variables considered. In addition, reduced-form regressions relating regulation to the 
various measures of aggregate economic performance indicate that regulation added over the 
last 50 years has reduced aggregate output substantially, both by shifting the level of output 
down and by reducing output's trend rate of growth. Regulation is also found to affect total factor 
productivity and the factors of production, thus suggesting that regulation affects the allocation 
of resources in the economy. Finally, the effects of changes in regulation are found to be spread 
over time, thus altering the dynamic adjustment paths of all variables. 
This paper extends the analysis of Dawson and Seater in two ways. First, an aggregate 
production function framework is used which allows the co-movement of output and the factors 
of production to be related to regulation in a single-equation model. This approach differs from 
the analysis of Dawson and Seater, where regulation is related to each of the various macro 
variables individually (i.e., a different reduced-form regression is estimated for each macro 
variable). Second, the time-series (stationarity) properties of the underlying variables are 
exploited to uncover the short- and long-run relationships between regulation and aggregate 
economic performance using cointegration methodology. This technique avoids several 
potential problems associated with the standard regression analysis used in many of the 
existing studies of regulation and allows a more complete analysis of the underlying areas of 
regulation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the measure of federal regulation in 
the U.S. proposed by Dawson and Seater. Section III presents a simple model of aggregate 
production that relates regulation and economic performance, provides some preliminary 
evidence based on traditional regression analysis, and exposes some potential problems with 
this approach. Section IV discusses the time-series properties of the underlying variables and 
their implications for empirical analysis, and uses cointegration methodology to complete the 
empirical analysis. The last section concludes. 
II. MEASURING REGULATION: A BRIEF REVIEW 
The measure of federal regulation in the U.S. used in this paper is taken from Dawson and 
Seater (2006). The measure is the number of pages in the Code of Federal Regulations 
(hereafter, CFR). The CFR is the U.S. government publication that prints all federal regulations 
in existence during a given year. This section provides a brief discussion of the CFR and the 
measure of regulation extracted from it. For a more complete discussion, see the Appendix in 
Dawson and Seater. Full details on the construction of the CFR measure are provided in 
Dawson (2000). 
The CFR was first published in 1938. It was divided into 50 ‘titles’, each of which pertains to a 
major division of regulation, such as agriculture, banking, environment, labor, shipping, etc. The 
structure of 50 titles continues today. The second complete edition of the CFR was published in 
1949. Between 1938 and 1949, annual supplements to the CFR were published, listing changes 
in regulations. Because of the way the annual supplements were done, it is difficult to use them 
to update the 1938 edition of the CFR to obtain annual page counts. After 1949, the annual 
supplements were replaced by ‘pocket’ supplements, which were done differently than the 
annual supplements. In addition, updated versions of entire titles were published with increasing 
frequency after 1949. The pocket supplements together with the intermittent title revisions make 
it possible to construct fairly accurate annual page counts for the CFR between 1949 and 1969. 
Since 1969, the entire CFR has been revised annually, so annual page counts can be obtained 
directly. 
Counting pages in the CFR to measure regulation obviously has limitations (e.g., it cannot 
capture the vigor of enforcement), but it is reasonable to believe that the number of pages of 
printed regulation is an indicator of the extent of regulation. Federal law requires that all federal 
regulations be printed in the CFR; if there were no regulations reported in the CFR, there would 
be no federal regulation, suggesting a positive correlation between the CFR page count and the 
amount of regulation. Other studies have proposed measures of regulation based on page 
counts (or similar) in the Federal Register and U.S. Code2. However, these publications include 
information other than regulations. Thus, the measure offered by Dawson and Seater is a more 
accurate measure of regulation, and also covers a much longer time span than these 
alternatives3. 
Figure 1 shows the time series for the total page count of the CFR from 1949 to 1999 as 
reported in Dawson and Seater. Regulation grows almost all the time, but its growth rate varies 
a great deal. Periods of negative growth are infrequent, and, when negative, the magnitude of 
the growth rate always is small. High growth rates occur in the 1970s, even though that period 
saw important deregulation in transportation, telecommunications, and energy. Clearly, any 
deregulation that did occur in those industries is more than offset by increased regulation in 
other areas, as Hopkins (1991) has noted. The behavior of the regulatory series is equally 
interesting during the 1980s, when the Reagan administration promoted deregulation as a 
national priority. Although the growth in the number of pages in the CFR slows during the 
1980s, a decrease in total pages occurs only in one year, 1985. The 1990s witnessed the 
largest reduction in pages of regulation in the history of the CFR, when three consecutive years 
of decline are recorded. This coincides with the Clinton administration's ‘reinventing 
government’ initiative which boasted of reduced regulation in general and a reduction in the 
number of pages in the CFR in particular. 
 




III. MODEL, PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE, AND POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
This section provides a brief outline of the model used to study the relationship between 
regulation and macroeconomic performance, and then presents some empirical evidence that 
serves as an initial reference point for the analysis that follows in the next section of the paper. 
 
3.1. The Model 
The empirical analysis in the remainder of the paper is based on a simple model of aggregate 
production. Let aggregate private-sector output, Yt, be determined by the production technology  
         (1) 
where Nt represents aggregate employment of labor services and Kt represents the flow of 
services from the stock of private capital. At is an index of total factor productivity or Hicks-
neutral technical change which is assumed to be a function of aggregate shocks, Zt, and 
government regulation, Rt; i.e.,  
         (2) 
By assuming a generalized Cobb-Douglas form for the aggregate production function and taking 
natural logarithms, (1) can be rewritten as  
          (3) 
where lower-case letters denote logarithms of their upper-case counterparts and ei represents 
the elasticity of output with respect to factor i=N, K. If the technology (1) exhibits constant 
returns to scale over the inputs Nt and Kt, then eN+eK= 1
4. Under this assumption, (3) can be 
written as  
       (4) 
If we make explicit reference to the factors affecting productivity, at, as described in (2), we can 
derive an empirical specification that is useful for testing the effects of government regulation on 
aggregate economic activity. This specification is taken from (4) under the assumption that the 
implicit function (2) can be expressed as a log-linear relation of the determinants of total factor 
productivity; namely,  
     (5) 
where ∈t is a disturbance term. The regulation measure enters the equation as the regulation-to-
capital ratio, (rt−kt), to maintain consistency with the other level variables in the model. Up to J 
lags of the regulation measure are included, as regulatory change may affect economic activity 
over an extended period of time. From a theoretical standpoint, it is unclear whether the 
regulation parameters ωj are positive or negative. Different types of regulations may have 
different affects on production, some positive and some negative, thus leaving the anticipated 
impact of the aggregate regulation variable ambiguous. This, ultimately, is an empirical issue, 
which is the focus of this paper. 
The empirical analysis throughout the paper utilizes annual data from the U.S. The measure of 
regulation (r) is the CFR measure used by Dawson and Seater (2006) over the period 1949 to 
1999, as discussed in Section II5. Data on private business output (y), hours of labor services 
(n), and private capital services (k) are prepared by the U.S. Department of Labor and reported 
in the Monthly Labor Review6. Output is real output in the private business sector, which is 
gross domestic product less output produced by the government, private households, and non-
profit institutions. Labor is hours worked by all persons in the private business sector, computed 
as a Tornqvist aggregate of hours of all persons using hourly compensation as weights. Capital 
is the service flows of equipment, structures, inventories, and land, computed as a Tornqvist 
aggregate of capital stocks using rental prices as weights. The capacity utilization rate in the 
manufacturing sector of the economy (cu), published in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, is used as 
a proxy for z. 
 
3.2. Preliminary Evidence 
This subsection provides a summary analysis of the relationship between regulation and 
macroeconomic performance. OLS estimates of equation (5) are reported in Table 1. Five lags 
of the regulation variable are included to capture the adjustment of economic activity over time 
to changes in regulation (i.e., J= 5 in equation (5) above)7. Estimation of the model includes a 
correction for first-order serial correlation in the error process, which is sufficient to eliminate any 
evidence of serial correlation up to lag 12 in the residuals based on the Breusch-Godfrey serial 
correlation LM test. The estimates reported in the first two columns of Table 1 are the sum of 
current and lagged coefficients on the regulation variables, , along with F-statistics for 
the significance of the sum. The first row of the table uses the measure of aggregate regulation 
(i.e., total pages in the CFR), while the remaining rows consider specific areas of regulation 
(pages in the individual titles of the CFR). Note that each row of Table 1 reports a separate 
estimate of equation (5). Thus, the analysis of specific areas of regulation involves the 
estimation of separate regressions, each using the individual titles of the CFR in turn (rather 
than jointly estimating the impact of each title simultaneously in a single equation). Further 




The results in the first row of Table 1 report a statistically significant negative relationship 
between output per unit of capital and the aggregate regulation-capital ratio8. A one percentage 
point increase in the regulation-capital ratio is associated with a combined 0.24 percentage 
point reduction in the productivity of capital over the five-year adjustment period considered 
here. Turning now to the individual areas of regulation, the results suggest that some areas of 
regulation are important and some are not. The current and lagged impact of regulation in Titles 
15 (commerce), 20 (employee benefits), 22 (foreign relations), 24 (housing credit), 29 (labor), 30 
(mineral resources), 37 (patents and copyrights), 42 (public health), 49 (transportation), and 50 
(wildlife and fisheries) are found to be significantly related to output per unit of capital. For each 
of these areas, the estimated impact is negative. The estimated size of the impact differs across 
these areas, ranging from a 0.05 percentage point decrease to a 0.12 percentage point 
decrease in capital productivity for each one percentage point increase in the regulation-capital 
ratio over a five-year period. Not surprisingly, each of these individual effects is estimated to be 
smaller than the 0.24 percentage point effect estimated for the aggregate measure of regulation 
in row one of the table. Looking across the list of areas that are found to be significantly related 
to economic activity, there is no rationale for explaining why these particular areas of regulation 
are significant and others are not. It is easy, for example, to imagine that labor regulations or 
transportation regulations negatively impact output. But, it is also easy to imagine that many of 
the areas not found to be significant could be related to growth, either positively or negatively. 
Ultimately, determining which areas of regulation are significantly related to growth is simply an 
empirical issue. 
 
3.3. Potential Problems 
In closing the discussion of the OLS results reported in Table 1, note that the perspective of 
modern dynamic economics questions the validity of this approach. First, the levels of 
aggregate time series are often found to be nonstationary, possibly making them unsuitable for 
use in standard regression analysis. Second, there are questions about the appropriate 
estimation technique given the possible presence of multicollinearity and omitted variables bias. 
Further discussion of the nonstationarity issue is deferred to the next section. The potential for 
the omitted variables problem, as it applies to the study of regulation and the macroeconomy in 
particular, is described further here. 
Recall that Table 1 reports separate estimates of the model in equation (5) by using each of the 
individual titles of the CFR in separate regressions. The objective of this approach is to 
determine which specific areas of regulation have an impact on the aggregate economy. 
However, there is a problem with this approach. Namely, the page counts of the various titles of 
the CFR are highly correlated with one another. The mean correlation among page counts of 
the individual titles is 0.60, with an even higher median of 0.77. The maximum correlation is 
0.99, and the minimum correlation is −0.76. Such high correlations imply that including just one 
type of regulation in a statistical analysis is likely to be misleading because of this collinearity 
and the consequent omitted variables problem9. 
The collinearity problem is even more severe when addressing the issues of macroeconomic 
dynamics. The correlations among the individual titles discussed above are all 
contemporaneous. For analyzing time-series behavior, the dynamic relations among various 
types of regulation are also important. Granger-causality tests can be used to show the 
intertemporal dependence of one series on another after accounting for the first series' 
dependence on its own lagged values. As an example of the kind of dependence that can exist 
between different titles of the CFR, Granger-causality tests were conducted for Title 16 
(Commercial Practices) and Title 29 (Labor Relations). The Granger-causality tests show that 
the page counts of those titles both Granger-cause and are Granger-caused by the page count 
of the other title. Similar results are found for most of the other titles of the CFR. These results 
show that there are temporal orderings in the statistical relations among the types of regulation 
and provide strong evidence that a time-series analysis restricted to a subset of regulations is 
likely to suffer from serious omitted variables bias. 
In closing, note that the forgoing discussion has important implications for the approach used in 
many of the existing studies of regulation. Most studies rely on measures of specific areas of 
regulation, such as regulation of entry, labor regulations, or regulation of a particular industry 
(such as transportation). This reliance, of course, is primarily due to the inherent difficulties in 
measuring total regulation. If the objective is to estimate the impact of total regulation (as in this 
study), the high correlations among the different areas of regulation might actually be 
considered good news – because they suggest that a subset of regulations may capture the 
behavior of aggregate regulation. Indeed, in a recent study, Nicoletti et al. (2001, p. 43) interpret 
their indicators of regulation as ‘a proxy for the overall regulatory policies followed by OECD 
countries over the sample period’. Examination of the data, however, shows this hope to be ill-
founded. Nicoletti et al.'s measure spans 1978–1998 and shows a 66% decline over that period. 
As it turns out, subsets of CFR titles corresponding to Nicoletti et al.'s measure behave similarly 
over that period. For example, Titles 23 (Highways), 46 (Shipping), and 49 (Transportation) of 
the CFR encompass regulation of air transport, railways, and road freight, one of Nicoletti et al.'s 
regulation groups. The page counts of these titles drop from a total of 8,400 in 1978 to 8,261 in 
1998, thus exhibiting behavior which is qualitatively similar to Nicoletti et al.'s measure. 
Nevertheless, the page count of the whole CFR displays the opposite behavior, rising 47% over 
the 1978–1998 period. Therefore, subsets of regulation are not reliable proxies for total 
regulation. 
 
IV. COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
As discussed above, a number of potential pitfalls exist with the use of standard regression 
analysis. One concern is the failure to account for the time-series properties of the variables 
used in the analysis. In particular, standard regression analysis may be inappropriate if the time 
series are found to be nonstationary. A second problem pertains to omitted variables bias, 
which occurs when important variables are left out of the empirical specification. Such a 
problem was shown to exist when specific areas of regulation are used individually in the 
analysis. Failure to address these problems could skew statistical inference when standard OLS 
techniques are used, resulting in inconsistent estimates of how a change in regulation affects 
the economy. This section presents an alternative approach, based on the theory of 
cointegration, which can address these difficulties. 
 
4.1. Estimating Long-Run Trends 
It is well known in the macroeconomics literature that many macro variables contain a stochastic 
trend, and that conventional estimation techniques do not take into account the implications of 
this type of nonstationarity. It is not surprising, then, that standard Dickey-Fuller tests indicate 
the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected for the variables (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k)10. 
Empirical analysis such as that presented in the previous section may not be appropriate in the 
presence of nonstationary variables, since findings of statistical significance may be spurious. 
We now present an alternative approach for measuring the effects of regulation – based on the 
theory of cointegration – which takes into account the nonstationarity properties of the 
underlying data11. 
 
Figure 2. Plots of Raw Data Used in Analysis 
 
 
The concept of cointegration is illustrated using the model described above, which provides the 
empirical specification given in equation (5). However, the cointegration methodology is not 
conditional on any particular theoretical model and is robust to a variety of departures from the 
framework presented above. Equation (5) is repeated here for convenience:  
   (5) 
The goal is to estimate the parameters ωj. First, the appropriate estimation technique must 
account for the time-series (nonstationarity) properties of the variables in (5). Recall from above 
that conventional unit root tests indicate the variables (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k) are nonstationary. 
Similar tests indicate, however, that the first differences of these variables Δ(y−k), Δ(n−k), and 
Δ(r−k), are stationary. In other words, the variables (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k) are said to be first-
order integrated, or I(1). If the error term ∈ in (5), on the other hand, is stationary, or I(0), then 
the variables (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k) are said to be cointegrated. That is, the variables in (5) are 
individually trending (i.e., nonstationary), but they share a common long-run trend while 
deviating from each other only in the short run. Intuitively, we expect this result; otherwise, the 
variables (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k) would be found to drift unrealistically away from one another. 
Johansen (1988, 1991) provides a test for cointegration as well as the number of distinct 
cointegrating relationships (vectors) among a set of variables. The results of Johansen tests 
reported in Table 2 support the hypothesis that (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k) are cointegrated, which 
suggests that the error term, in (5) is in fact stationary. The finding of cointegration is important 
for several reasons relating to the estimation of the relationship between regulation and 
macroeconomic performance. First, notice that the error term in (5) will typically be both serially 
correlated and correlated with the regressors (n−k) and (r−k). While serial correlation is 
straightforward to address in conventional econometric techniques, correlation between the 
error term and the regressors leads to inconsistent parameter estimates when the variables in 
(5) are not cointegrated. When the variables are cointegrated, however, OLS estimation of the 
cointegrating parameters – or cointegrating vector – is robust to the presence of this type of 
correlation. This property results because ∈ (error term) is stationary while the regressors are 
individually nonstationary. There may be some transitory correlation between the error term and 
the regressors, but the long-run correlation must be zero since trending variables must 
eventually diverge from stationary ones. Thus, the finding of cointegration among the variables 





A second desirable property that results from similar reasoning is that the estimation of 
cointegrated systems is robust to a wide range of underlying theoretical models. Consistent 
estimates of the cointegrating relationship among the variables in (5) can be obtained even if 
there are omitted explanatory variables that are correlated with the regressors. In other words, 
as long as the variables in (5) are cointegrated, we can consistently estimate the parameters of 
that long-run relationship. This property is particularly important in light of the discussion in the 
previous section regarding the high correlation between individual titles of regulation and the 
consequent omitted variables problem. Thus, cointegration analysis can be used to identify 
which specific areas of regulation are important at the macroeconomic level and reliable 
estimates of each area's impact can be obtained. We now turn to the empirical procedure for 
estimating these relationships. 
The logic of the discussion above requires the presence of a single cointegrating vector linking 
(y−k), (n−k), and (r−k). The results of the Johansen ‘Trace’ test reported in Table 2 suggest that 
the hypothesis of a single cointegrating vector is in fact consistent with the data. Therefore, we 
can proceed with the estimation of the cointegrating vector using single-equation techniques12. 
As noted, standard OLS estimation will produce consistent estimates of the cointegrating vector. 
However, statistical inference cannot be carried out using conventional standard errors; a 
correction for serial correlation is necessary. 
We use the dynamic OLS (DOLS) procedure suggested by Stock and Watson (1993), as 
described in Hamilton (1994, p. 608), to estimate the cointegrating relationship between the 
variables of interest. This procedure specifies a single equation of the form:  
 
 (6) 
where Δ is the first-difference operator and,   is related to ∈t such that 
. Equation (6) is estimated by 
OLS, with leads and lags of the first differences of the right-hand-side variables included to 
eliminate the effects of regressor endogeneity on the distribution of the OLS estimator. A non-
parametric correction for serial correlation is required for the t-statistics; see Hamilton (pp. 610–
611) for details. This procedure provides consistent estimates of the cointegrating vector 
{1, −π, −γ} and the corrected t-statistics can be compared to standard t-tables. 
Equation (6) appears, at first glance, to be very similar to equation (5) estimated in the previous 
section. There are, however, some noteworthy differences. Unlike equation (5), equation (6) 
contains leads and lags of the first differences of all right-hand-side variables. Equation (5) 
includes lags of the level of the regulation variable only. Thus, the estimates of the regulation 
parameter from equation (5) are the sum of the coefficients on the current and lagged levels of 
regulation, in order to capture the long-run impact of regulation when there are adjustment lags. 
By contrast, the estimation of the single parameter γ in equation (6) measures the long-run 
impact of regulation. Likewise, equation (5) includes the capacity utilization rate, cu, as an 
explanatory variable to proxy for aggregate shocks, z, in order to account for short-run 
economic fluctuations around the trend relationship. Equation (6), however, does not include a 
proxy for z, and leads and lags are included simply to eliminate the effects of regressor 
endogeneity on the distribution of the least squares estimator. Intuitively, equation (6) is 
specified to estimate only the cointegrating relationship among (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k) in the long 
run. By contrast, equation (5), as estimated in Table 1, implicitly models both the long-run 
parameters and the adjustment of the economy to changes in regulation over the short run. It is 
reasonable to suppose that a procedure – such as the estimation of equation (6)– that 
separates these two steps will provide more accurate estimates of the long-run trend 
relationship. 
To facilitate comparison with previous results, the DOLS estimates of γ from equation (6) are 
reported alongside the estimated regulation parameters from equation (5) in Table 1. The DOLS 
estimation uses k= 313. The corrected t-statistics are also reported. In the first row of the table, 
the aggregate measure of regulation is used. The results suggest a negative relationship 
between regulation and output per unit of capital over the long run. The size of the impact is 
estimated to be slightly larger than in the analysis of the previous section – a one percentage 
point increase in the regulation-capital ratio causes nearly a 0.27 percentage point decrease in 
output per unit of capital, compared to a 0.24 percentage point decrease estimated in the 
previous section. 
In the remaining rows of Table 1, the individual titles of regulation are used in the analysis. 
Again, each row reports a separate application of the DOLS procedure, each using the 
individual titles of the CFR in turn. Recall, however, that the cointegration analysis is not subject 
to the omitted variables problem discussed in the previous section. Of the 32 areas of regulation 
considered, 22 are found to have a statistically significant long-run impact on aggregate 
economic activity14. Only 10 such areas were found in the previous section. Additional areas of 
regulation found to be important using the present analysis include Titles 13 (business credit), 
17 (commodity and securities exchange), 18 (conservation of power), 19 (customs duties), 21 
(food and drugs), 23 (highways), 26 (internal revenue), 28 (judicial administration), 36 (parks 
and forests), 38 (pensions, bonuses, and veterans relief), 41 (public contracts), and 43 (public 
lands). In each case where a title is found to be statistically significant in both analyses, the size 
of the estimated impact is larger using the cointegration analysis. The largest negative impact is 
associated with Title 19, with a −0.34 percentage point impact. This title was not found to be 
statistically significant in the estimation of (5). Only one title was found to be significant in the 
estimation of (5), but not in the present analysis – Title 29 (labor). 
Interestingly, several areas of regulation are estimated to have a positive effect on the economy. 
These include Titles 13, 18, 21, 26, 28, and 41. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that 
regulations relating to the judicial system (Title 28) might have such an effect, insofar as these 
regulations promote the enforcement of property rights and contracts. Admittedly, it is more 
difficult to explain how regulations relating to internal revenue (Title 26) might have a positive 
effect. The largest positive impact is associated with Title 26, with a 0.75 percentage point 
impact. This title was not found to be statistically significant in the estimation of (5). 
Before closing the discussion of the cointegration results, it is important to assess the 
robustness of these results. The robustness issue is especially important in light of the empirical 
nature of the relationship between regulation and macro performance (i.e., given the lack of a 
theoretical prediction regarding regulation's effect on the economy). One simple test for 
robustness involves splitting the sample into two sub-periods to see if the results from the whole 
sample also hold for the sub-samples15. To accomplish this test, the 1949–1999 sample period 
used in the analysis above is split into two equal periods: 1949–1975 and 1976–1999. Johansen 
tests indicate the presence of a single cointegrating vector among the variables (y−k), (n−k), 
and (r−k) during these sub-periods under assumptions similar to those used in Table 2 (using 
total pages in the CFR as the measure of regulation). Applying the DOLS procedure to each of 
these sub-samples also provides evidence consistent with that for the whole sample. 
Specifically, total regulation (total pages in the CFR) is found to be negatively related to 
aggregate economic performance. For the 1949–1975 period, the estimated coefficient on 
regulation is −0.4347 (with an adjusted t-statistic of −9.36); for the 1976–1999 period, the 
estimated coefficient on regulation is −0.3776 (−12.62). In fact, these estimated impacts of 
regulation (and the t-statistics) are larger than those for the whole sample (as reported in the 
first row of Table 1). Thus, the results do not appear to be dependent on the sample period 
considered in the analysis. 
Another simple way to test for robustness involves changing the empirical specification to see if 
the results with respect to regulation are affected. Since it is possible that the regulation 
measure could be capturing some aspect of government activity in the economy other than 
regulation itself, an obvious choice would be to introduce a new variable that captures 
government activity into the specification to determine if the statistical significance of the 
regulation variable is affected. Along these lines, a measure of government capital is added to 
the specification in (6). Specifically, the specification in (6) is augmented to include the variable 
(g−k) along with k leads and lags of Δ(g−k), where g is the natural logarithm of government 
capital measured as federal, state, and local government equipment and structures (fixed 
nonresidential government capital) excluding military equipment and structures (obtained from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis). Johansen tests indicate the presence of a single 
cointegrating vector among the variables (y−k), (n−k), (g−k), and (r−k) under assumptions 
similar to those used in Table 2. Applying the DOLS procedure to the expanded specification 
provides evidence that regulation is negatively related to economic performance even when 
government capital is included in the model. The estimated coefficient on the regulation variable 
(total pages in the CFR) is −0.3580 (with an adjusted t-statistic of −9.30). Again, this estimated 
impact (and t-statistic) is even larger than the results reported in the first row of Table 1. Thus, 
the results appear to be robust to this change in the empirical specification. This result is not 
surprising since, as discussed above, one of the properties of the cointegration methodology is 
its ability to provide consistent parameter estimates of the cointegrating vector even when there 
are omitted variables that are correlated with the regressors. The foregoing test for robustness 
also demonstrates this important property. 
In summary, the cointegration analysis generally confirms most of the results from the OLS 
analysis presented in the previous section. However, the cointegration analysis suggests an 
even larger negative impact of aggregate regulation on the economy over the long run. The 
results also suggest a larger impact from those specific areas of regulation found previously to 
be significant, and suggest that some additional areas of regulation are significantly related to 
economic performance – some positive and some negative. Taken together, the results suggest 
an important impact of regulation on the macroeconomy. These results are robust to splitting the 
sample period in half and adding a measure of government capital to the empirical specification. 
 
4.2. Estimating Short-Run Dynamics 
To discuss the short-run dynamics implied by the relationship between regulation and the 
macroeconomy, consider a model that imposes the long-run (cointegrating) relationship 
estimated above while also allowing for temporary divergences from this trend. The model takes 
the form  
 
 (7) 
where Δx is the vector of first differences {Δ(y−k), Δ(n−k), Δ(r−k)}′. The parameters  and  
are the previously estimated cointegrating coefficients for (y−k), (n−k), and (r−k). The 
parameters μ, δ, and Φ govern the short-run dynamics. This restricted vector autoregression 
(VAR) specification is referred to as the error-correction representation of the system. For any 
set of cointegrated variables, the error-correction representation is the appropriate VAR for 
describing the short-run dynamics among the variables in that set. 
To examine the dynamic response of output to a shock in the regulation variable, a k= 2 version 
of the error-correction model (7) is estimated over the period 1949–199916. Note that the 
cointegrating vector obtained from the DOLS analysis above is imposed in the estimation of (7). 
Rather than report the individual parameter estimates, it is customary to study short-run 
dynamics using the impulse response functions and variance decompositions of the model 
variables. Figure 3 shows the matrix of impulse response functions when the aggregate 
measure of regulation is used in the analysis. The two-standard-deviation error bands are also 
shown for the responses. These graphs can be used to determine the length of time over which 
a change in regulation typically affects aggregate economic activity. The lower left graph in the 
figure shows the response of output per unit of capital to a one-standard-deviation shock in the 
regulation variable. Over the first two years following the shock, the change in regulation has 
virtually no effect on the economy; the standard-error bands are initially wide enough that the 
response cannot be considered more than noise. By contrast, over a horizon of 2–11 years, 
there is a statistically significant negative impact on output. 
 




Another perspective on the economy's dynamic response to a regulation shock can be gained 
using variance decompositions. The variance decompositions for (y−k) are reported in Table 3. 
These variance decompositions provide the percentage of the j-year ahead mean-squared 
forecast error in (y−k) due to innovations in the other model variables. The more interesting 
information is found at longer horizons, where the interaction among the model variables has 
sufficient time to become felt. Table 3 reports that the importance of regulation in explaining the 
variation in output increases over time. At five years out, nearly 20% of the variation in (y−k) is 
attributable to regulation; at a horizon of 15 years, more than half of the variation in (y−k) is 




The error-correction model can also be estimated using the individual areas of regulation. 
Although the results are not reported, impulse response analysis generally suggests that 
individual areas of regulation do not have important short-run effects. Variance decompositions 
can be used to indicate which individual areas may be related to short-run behavior, and these 
include Titles 15 (19% at a 15-year horizon), 17 (19%), 20 (22%), 29 (17%), 31 (18%), 33 
(28%), 42 (39%), and 47 (30%). We interpret these result as suggesting that these areas of 
regulation are most closely related to the economy's short-run behavior. It may also be that 
these specific areas of regulation do not have a large enough impact to be felt at the aggregate 
level, thus providing the statistically negligible effects from the impulse response analysis. 
However, it is reasonable to suppose that these areas of regulation may have important effects 
on particular sectors of the economy where their impact would be most evident. Ultimately, this 
is an empirical issue which we do not address here. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper uses a time series which consistently measures federal regulatory activity in the U.S. 
to investigate the empirical relationship between regulation and macroeconomic performance. 
The analysis builds on previous studies of this relationship by (1) using a single-equation 
aggregate production function model which describes how regulation affects output in the 
economy, and (2) using empirical techniques based on cointegration to address some potential 
problems in the estimation. Preliminary empirical evidence based on simple regression 
techniques indicate that regulation – both aggregate measures of regulation as well as some 
specific areas of regulation – may be significantly related to macroeconomic performance. 
When more advanced statistical techniques based on cointegration analysis are used, evidence 
of a long-run trend (cointegrating) relationship between output, capital, labor, and regulation is 
found. The empirical results indicate that regulatory activity has a significantly negative impact 
on aggregate economic performance in the U.S. The finding that regulation is important in 
determining long-run aggregate economic outcomes is further supported by an analysis of area-
specific regulations. The evidence suggests that 22 out of 32 areas of regulation have 
significant long-run effects, some negative and some positive. 
Estimation of an error-correction model, which takes the cointegrating relationship between 
regulation and the other model variables as given, allows an analysis of the time horizon over 
which regulation affects economic performance. Impulse response analysis indicates that a 
shock in the overall level of regulation negatively impacts economic activity over a horizon of 2–
11 years. Variance decompositions predict that regulation accounts for over half of the forecast 
error in output at a horizon of 15 years. The impact of area-specific regulations seems less 
noticeable on the aggregate economy in the short run, although variance decompositions 
suggest some areas may be related to short-run fluctuations. 
Although the results contained herein apply directly to the effects of regulation in the postwar 
U.S. economy, the application to other economies and other times is transparent. Regulatory 
activity which affects the behavior of economic agents has implications which can be measured 
at the aggregate level. Unfortunately, from a policy perspective, economic theory cannot predict 
how regulation at the micro-level translates into complex, dynamic adjustment of the economy 
at the macro-level. Empirical estimates of the economy's response to regulation, therefore, are a 
crucial part of effective policymaking. 
In closing, we note that many benefits of regulation may not be measured in economic terms. 
Thus, finding a negative economic effect of regulation should not be taken to mean that 
regulation imposes a net welfare cost on society. Such a finding does establish, however, a 






1. A number of other recent studies relate regulatory effects to macroeconomic concerns. For 
example, using OECD data, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) find that product regulation that 
creates barriers to entry reduces industry-level multifactor productivity growth. Alesina et al. 
(2003) find that such regulation reduces industrial investment. Djankov et al. (2002) construct a 
measure of regulation of entry in 85 countries and relate it to several country characteristics, 
such as the amount of corruption or the type of government. In a series of empirical papers by 
World Bank economists, Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999, 2002) and Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2003) study the ability of ‘perceived government effectiveness’, one 
component of which is regulation, to explain cross-country differences in per capita income. All 
of these studies, however, use regulation data in cross-sections or panels of countries which 
include little or no time dimension, thus making the analysis of macroeconomic dynamics 
difficult or impossible. We complement this body of evidence by using a strict time-series 
approach. 
2. See, for example, Friedman and Friedman (1979), Becker and Mulligan (1999), and Mulligan 
and Shleifer (2003). 
3. Goff (1996), in his pioneering work on regulation at the macroeconomic level, uses factor 
analysis to construct a clever composite measure of regulation, one component of which is the 
number of pages in the CFR. It spans almost as long a period as the Dawson and Seater (2006) 
measure, and it attempts to capture elements of enforcement vigor. Its main limitation is that, 
being a factor analysis construct, its meaning is unclear. 
4. The constant returns to scale assumption is consistent with the data used in the analysis 
below. OLS estimation of (3) with a correction for first-order serial correlation provides an F-
statistic of 1.21 (p-value = 0.2772) for the null hypothesis that eN+eK= 1. 
5. Although the CFR measure dates back to 1938, starting the sample in 1949 follows the 
standard practice of excluding the World War II period from the analysis, and also discards the 
period 1938–1949 during which there were no revisions in the CFR. 
6. Historical data on these variables are available at http://www.bls.gov/mfp. 
7. The lag length J= 5 was chosen using a ‘general to specific’ approach beginning with a 
maximum of 10 lags and sequentially eliminating the last lag when statistical significance at the 
10% level was not achieved. 
8. Although not reported in Table 1, the estimated coefficients on the other independent 
variables in the model are generally statistically significant and of the expected sign across all 
equations reported in the table. Detailed results are available upon request. 
9. High correlations among individual titles also causes multicollinearity problems in an analysis 
where all of the individual titles are included in a single regression equation. Multicollinearity 
problems aside, the large number of titles leaves too few degrees of freedom for such an 
analysis to provide any meaningful results. Dawson and Seater (2006) explore this possibility 
and conclude that the low degrees of freedom – which causes large standard errors and 
prevents the inclusion of lagged regulation – introduces sufficient biases in the estimation that 
no determination of which titles are statistically significant can be made. 
10. Test results are available upon request. The aggregate measure of regulation is used for the 
variable r in this test and throughout the following discussion. The series cu is stationary in 
levels according to this test. Plots of the series are provided in Figure 2. 
11. Recent developments in the time series econometrics literature suggest that conventional 
unit root tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root too often when the true data 
generating process is in fact trend stationary with a break in the intercept and/or slope of the 
trend funcion – that is, when the series is ‘trend-break stationary’. To explore this possibility, 
three separate tests for trend-break stationarity were conducted on each of the series in the 
model using the methodology of Zivot and Andrews (1992), Vogelsang and Perron (1998), and 
Sen (2003). The results consistently indicate no statistically significant structural breaks in the 
series; that is, the unit-root null hypothesis could not be rejected for any of the series. This 
finding of nonstationarity among the variables in the model further supports the use of the 
cointegration methodology in the analysis that follows. 
12. A finding of three distinct cointegrating vectors would indicate that the variables in the three-
dimensional system are stationary in levels, and that estimation in levels (as in the estimation of 
equation (5) in the previous section) is appropriate. The finding of a single cointegrating vector 
thus further supports the use of the cointegration approach to estimating the relationship 
between the variables in the system. 
13. The results are generally not sensitive to choosing different values for k. 
14. Cointegration tests analogous to those in Table 2 indicate the presence of a single 
cointegrating relationship among (y−k), (n−k), and the individual titles of regulation, with the 
possible exception of Titles 15, 22, 31, 33, 38, and 46. For these titles, interpretation of the 
DOLS results is somewhat tenuous. 
15. It is difficult to consider more than two sub-samples or shorter sub-samples because of the 
inherent degrees-of-freedom problems. 
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